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Abstract As part of the SYNBIOSAFE project, we car-
ried out an open electronic conference (e-conference), with
the aim to stimulate an open debate on the societal issues of
synthetic biology in a proactive way. The e-conference
attracted 124 registered participants from 23 different
countries and different professional backgrounds, who
wrote 182 contributions in six different categories: (I)
Ethics; (II) Safety; (III) Security; (IV) IPR; (V) Gover-
nance and regulation; (VI) and Public perception. In this
paper we discuss the main arguments brought up during the
e-conference and provide our conclusions about how the
community thinks, and thinks differently on the societal
impact of synthetic biology. Finally we conclude that there
is a chance for an open discourse on the societal issues of
synthetic biology happening, and that the rules to govern
such a discourse might be set up much easier and be
respected more readily than many would suggest.
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Aims and scope of the SYNBIOSAFE e-conference
Synthetic Biology (SB) is becoming one of the most
dynamic new ﬁelds of biology, with the potential to rev-
olutionize the way we do biotechnology today. By applying
the toolbox of engineering disciplines to biology, a whole
set of potential applications are made possible ranging very
widely across scientiﬁc and engineering disciplines. Some
of the potential beneﬁts of SB, such as the development of
low-cost drugs or the production of chemicals and energy
by engineered bacteria are projected to be enormous. There
are, however, also potential and perceived risks related to
deliberate or accidental damage. In order to ensure a vital
and successful development of this new scientiﬁc ﬁeld and
in addition to addressing its potential beneﬁts, it is abso-
lutely necessary to gather information about risks and to
devise biosafety strategies to minimize them. Also, the
ethical issues of SB are just beginning to be explored, with
few ethicists speciﬁcally focusing on the area of SB (de
Vriend 2006; van Est et al. 2007). While a few undertak-
ings on safety and ethics have recently started in the US,
our project SYNBIOSAFE is the ﬁrst initiative in Europe
which focuses particularly on the safety, security, and
ethical concerns and which tries to facilitate a socially
acceptable development of SB. We have co-organized the
safety/security and ethical sessions at the SB 3.0 in Zurich
last June, and since then have carried out a survey among
leading European SB practitioners regarding their view-
points on safety, security and ethical issues (e.g., Kelle
2007). We then wanted to discuss the selected issues with a
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we carried out an open online conference—or e-confer-
ence—on the internet. The aim of this open e-conference
was to further stimulate the debate on these issues in a
proactive way, at a relatively early stage. The discussions
and consultations during the e-conference were a ﬁrst
contribution to stimulate a wider debate on the societal
impact of SB.
Methodology
The preparation of the e-conference included four major
steps:
• The preparation of a background paper (Schmidt et al.
2008)
• The elaboration of a list of persons to be invited to join
the e-conference
• The technical set-up of the e-conference and different
forums
• The sending out of invitations and guidelines
The selection of invited people was primarily based on
participant lists from major SB related conferences,
notably SB2.0 (Berkeley, May 2006), SB3.0 (Zurich,
06/2007), the ESF conference on SB (ECSB) (Barcelona,
11/2007) the joint Visionary Seminar of Leuven. Inc and
IMEC (Leuven, 11/2007) and the list of 38 NGOs that
signed the petition letter against the SB 2.0 self-gover-
nance declaration. Moreover, SYNBIOSAFE project
members as well as the Advisory Board members were
encouraged to provide additional contacts of scientists,
non-scientists, relevant NGOs, and their representatives.
For the technical set up of the e-conference, speciﬁc
provisions were taken into consideration in order to avoid
any form of misuse. Comprehensive instructions were
given to participants through speciﬁc guidelines on how
to participate in the conference. The e-conference ﬁnally
took place between May 5 and June 9, 2008. Over this
period, weekly downloadable summaries gave an over-
view on the development of the e-conference. In the ﬁnal
week, an additional forum was created in view of
encouraging the participants to express and discuss
recommendations related to the questions and issues
raised during the e-conference.
Participation and statistics of the e-conference
We directly invited over 1,000 people (mainly scientists,
but also representatives from NGOs, funding agencies,
industry, and other stakeholders) to our e-conference.
In addition the e-conference was announced on several
websites.
1 Finally we had 124 registered participants from
23 different countries (see Figs. 1, 2) and from different
professional backgrounds (Fig. 3). In total 36 participants
actively posted one or more contributions to the online
forum, representing about 30% of the total number regis-
tered. Contributions were distributed to the different fora as
shown in Figs. 4 and 5. The Forum I on Ethical aspects
received the most attention from participants. Only three
postings were made regarding recommendations. This may
have been due to the fact that this forum had only been
subsequently added during the ﬁnal week of the
e-conference.
The original contributions can be seen at www.
synbiosafe.eu/forum and are also available in one com-
piled document (SYNBIOSAFE 2008).
Summary of contributions
We will now discuss the contributions made by the active
e-conference participants in the six main categories: (I)
Ethics; (II) Biosafety; (III) Biosecurity; (IV) Intellectual
property rights; (V) Regulation and governance; (VI)
Public perception, communication and the media.
Participants by World Region
Europe
54%
Asia
8%
Other
9%
USA
29%
Fig. 1 Distribution of registered participants by world regions, the
total number of participants was 124. Asian participants came from
China, India, Japan, and Georgia. The category ‘‘other’’ includes
participants from Australia, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, and New
Zealand
1 Example http://syntheticbiology.org, or in the English and German
Wikipedia entries on SB. Also other people posted the note on their
respective websites.
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In this category, we touched upon topics that we expected
might give rise to ethical concerns in the ﬁeld of SB. We
did so through eight statements and questions (see
background paper) which we felt might trigger debate.
Interestingly, the ethics section of the forum was viewed
more frequently than the other sections (over 400 views).
This indicates that while the safety and security aspects of
SB may be most pressing, those interested in the ﬁeld are
also keen to discuss the various ethical and philosophical
concerns that may arise.
In one topic, we addressed a central theme within SB:
the idea of ‘creating life’ from scratch, in a way only nature
has done so far (‘playing God’) as well as the often pow-
erful yet difﬁcult to pin-point feeling of uneasiness that
surrounds the emergence of such a technology, a feeling
that may either reﬂect our prejudices or be an indicator of
deeper ethical problems. This topic received much interest
within the forum with contributors taking the opportunity
of the platform to sound out their own intuitions on this
issue.
As expected, participants highlighted the importance of
deﬁning what ‘life’ is: ‘‘Is it just organisms that are on a
biochemical level related to the biochemistry of natural
living organisms on earth?…Many of the things we call
‘synthetic life forms’—such as Mycoplasma laboratori-
um—are actually almost 100% based on natural species—
the reason we call them synthetic life is more the process of
how we instantiate them’’. This concern precisely pin
points the difﬁcult conceptual questions surrounding SB,
which are sometimes underestimated in their effect on
sharing the normative debate around it.
Another participant felt that ‘the concept of ‘life’ as a
vague mysterious property that is magically bestowed upon
organisms is misleading: ‘‘We are currently making good
progress in understanding the mechanics of microorgan-
isms…It becomes obvious that such microorganisms are
‘just’ machines, and that the creation of new such
Participants: Europe
UK
23%
DE
19%
CH
10%
FR
9%
NL
9%
AT
7%
ES
7%
BE
6%
IT
6%
DK
1%
EU
1%
RU
1%
RO
1%
Fig. 2 Most European participants were from the United Kingdom,
followed by Germany, Switzerland, France, and the Netherlands.
Only one participant came from Eastern Europe (Romania), one from
Russia, and one from the European Commission (EU). All values are
rounded (n = 67)
Participants: Background
ELSA
Science
Science
Industry / Business
8%
NGOs
7%
Funding org. and
Regulation
authority
7%
Students
5%
Other
4%
Fig. 3 About two-thirds of the participants were scientists, either
scientists working in R&D (science) or scientists working in e.g.,
ethics, political sciences, safety, security, intellectual property rights,
governance (ELSA science). Some participants, however, were from
the industry or business, from NGOs, funding organizations and
regulatory authorities. The smallest fraction was made up of students
and other (ﬁlm makers, journalists, think tanks, artists)
Number of replies per category
Other issues
1%
Regulation and
Governance
5%
Intellectual
Property Right
20%
Ethics
28%
Public perception, 
communication and
the media
11%
Biosecurity
20%
Biosafety
15%
Fig. 4 According to the number of postings (replies) per category,
Ethics received the highest attention, followed by IPR, Biosecurity,
and Biosafety (n = 182)
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123machines shouldn’t be considered differently’’. Both par-
ticipants here illustrate the complexity involved in
establishing a conceptual base for the ethical framework,
given the existing pluralism in attitude and approach
towards living organisms.
According to a participant, the existing debate on the
ethics of sciences applies well to SB and as such, there are
no new ethical issues. Here, as it was noted, the discussion
essentially revolved around the ‘ethics of consequence’
(something is good if it produces good consequences, in
this case good applications), rather than an ‘ethics of
principles’. However, according to one observer, even
applying the ethics of consequences is not necessarily
objective: ‘‘the debate on genetically engineered crops has
demonstrated how the appreciation of consequences can
differ. What is a good and what is a bad consequence is
always related to a certain situation of reference… it is
very important to be aware of this societal context’’.
However, most concerns related to products and applica-
tions and many felt that rather than concentrating on the act
of creating new life or living organisms, we should con-
centrate on the attributes of these new organisms. While
creating ‘more-of-the-same’ could be considered ethically
unproblematic, certain (formerly absent) characteristics or
uses of synthetic organisms may require special scrutiny.
Taking this point further, some suggest that as long as new
Number of views per topic
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
III.x. Funding biosecurity 
V.x. Economic and Proliferative Effects of Attempting Regulation 
V.c. Which regulation model? 
III.y. Future scenarios for synthetic biology 
O.x. Synthetic Biology: a philosophical perspective 
II.d. Future applications for food or medicine 
I.x. Forgetting an universal ethics for SynBio 
IV.x. The Meaning and Feasibility of Open Source Biology 
II.e. New biosafety systems 
VI.b. How to deal with upcoming public debates? 
I.b. Impact of ethical debates in other technologies 
O.y. Biased discourses 
V.b. The precautionary principle? 
VI.a. The danger of public resistance 
I.h. Impact of public concerns in determining ethical issues 
II.b. New challenges for risk assessment 
II.x. Avoid yet another GMO debate, please! 
II.c. Controlled environmental release 
III.c. Interaction between SB and biosecurity communities 
II.a. Biosafety in synthetic biology: anything new? 
I.e. Are patents unethical? 
I.d. The design of living machines 
I.f. Synthetic biology in human medicine 
III.a. Biosecurity awareness among SB practitioners 
V.a. The need of new regulatory approaches 
IV.b. SB areas where patenting is justified 
III.e. The transatlantic dialogue 
VI.c. Stimulate the public debate or not? 
III.d. Need of a European Biosecurity Oversight Organisation 
I.g. Is synbio widening the gap between rich and poor? 
II.f. Biohackery 
III.b. Self-governance 
I.a. New ethical issues in synthetic biology? 
IV.c. Accessibility of patented scientific knowledge 
IV.a. Patents or open source? 
I.c. The synthesis/creation of living organism 
Fig. 5 According to the number of views per topic, four topics from two categories (ethics and IPR) were most popular, followed by four topics
from the categories biosecurity and biosafety
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123characteristics do not pose new safety concerns, they
should not be considered ethically problematic either.
Participants also tackled the suggestion that a negative
intuition or feeling of uneasiness may work as an indicator
of ethical concerns regarding a technology that shakes some
of our deep-rooted beliefs regarding life and living organ-
isms as created by nature. One such person, having closely
witnessed the deliberation of a policy-making body, warned
against the tendency to take moral intuitions too seriously,
illustrating how legislation on such topics may be difﬁcult
to establish unless backed by other substantive arguments:
‘‘An argument simply based on discomfort is very unlikely
to ﬁnd much support. Nor are arguments about intrinsic
values…unless they can be tied to some notion of harm’’.
This thread was taken further by comparing how the dis-
comfort around SB might be compared to that which arose,
and continues to arise around reproductive technologies,
which challenge concepts of family and parenthood.
With respect to the idea of ‘playing God’, it was argued
that human activities of all kinds, including science and
technology could be considered ‘natural’. In other words,
playing God need not necessarily be used as a basis for
admonition. However, a certain amount of precaution is
required: ‘‘We may think that we can accurately predict the
consequences of our actions with respect to living organ-
isms—but history tells a different story. Hence a sensible
degree of respect for the precautionary principle should
remain…Can we pull the plug? Can we stop our project
before it spirals out of control? That is an ethical question.’’
In a third question, we asked whether SB in human cells
and human beings should be allowed, especially in the
context of medicine but also for possible non-therapeutic
uses. While some earlier contributors to the forum warned
against letting our imaginations run wild towards GATT-
ACA-like scenarios, much of the discussion did in fact veer
towardsthetopicofenhancementandtranshumanism.Here,
some effort was made to distinguish between transhumanist
and eugenic movements: whereas the idea of ‘superhumans’
is interesting, we must distinguish between ‘eugenical’
conceptions and the ideas of personal self-transformation,
which were the original roots of transhumanism. However,
this topic dried out at an early stage, principally because it
was felt that SB may not be at a stage where such scenarios
are likely to be realized. One participant felt that while it is
not too early to start such a discussion, more importance
should be given to discussing what we want to achieve with
SB and how the research should be carried out.
On the question of whether SB might widen the gap
between the rich and the poor, two participants agreed that
because the costs of proliferation and scale-up are marginal
for SB products, SB may in fact reduce rather than widen
the gap between rich and poor: ‘‘Poor, developing coun-
tries have many disadvantages, such as a lack of educated
scientists, insufﬁcient infrastructure etc., so that it will be
difﬁcult for them to participate in the very complex (and
thus expensive) process of developing new SB products.
However, these disadvantages apply to every technical
ﬁeld and are not speciﬁc to SB. Then, as opposed to vir-
tually all other technical ﬁelds, the ‘free’ (to a ﬁrst
approximation) scale-up of living systems is an important
advantage that could be leveraged by developing
countries’’.
The ﬁnal point which received some attention from
participants to the forum was one raised by a participant. He
suggested that SB was offering us a context in which there
were no coded answers from classical ethical systems.
Assuming that we need a new ethical framework for SB, his
suggestion was that there should be a (transitory) ethics of
emotions to address this new human creationist environ-
ment. As an answer, another participant felt that such an
approach would closely match that of a philosophy of ex-
tropy, which ‘‘is based on the values of openness, rational
thinking, self-direction and the proactionary principle’’.
The main concern regarding this approach would be that
such an approach will have to come from within the com-
munitybut it was felt that such a development will not occur
unless there is outside pressure: ‘‘At the same time there is
the problem to consider…that good will and freedom of
beliefs will bring universal agreement. And this is the typ-
ical mistake. People usually act in a certain way when there
are forced (by external or internal pressures) to it.’’
Summarizing the input in the ethics category, the most
popular topic was the creation of living organisms. While
some participants felt that the creation of synthetic
organisms presented no real ethical concerns, others argued
that this presented at least some new philosophical ques-
tions with regards to the deﬁnition of life. Whether SB
presented new ethical question was also subject to diver-
gent opinions. While some felt that the new technology
presented no new ethical concerns as long as the risks were
contained, others felt that the creation of new life required
the creation of a new ethics, to answer questions that may
arise with the development of new products. Concerns
where directed at the products of SB rather than on the
technology itself. Application on human cells gave rise to a
discussion on enhancement and transhumanism. Finally,
regarding whether we should worry about a potential ‘‘SB-
divide’’, similar to an IT-divide, a gene-divide or a nano-
divide, it was felt that beyond the initial infrastructural
difﬁculties, the production of synthetic organisms may
become a viable technology for developing countries.
Biosafety
To begin with, we asked whether SB raised new biosafety
questions at all. This is directly linked to the deﬁnition of
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in a traditional sense. The question was raised whether
there is a difference between GMOs and synthetic organ-
isms, and where to draw the boundary.
A participant understood the reassembly of existing
genetic elements into a single life form (genetic circuits,
biobricks) and the quest for a minimal organism to be
sophisticated continuations of genetic engineering. This
implies that the biosafety issues would only differ quanti-
tatively and not qualitatively. Participants, however,
concluded that if the ‘‘de-skilling’’ agenda (in other words
to make it easier to construct new life forms) would prove
successful and more people would be able to design new
living systems, a qualitatively new challenge would arise.
Also the construction of life forms based on alternative
biological systems (e.g., chemically different nucleotides)
would raise qualitatively different challenges.
We further asked whether the current biosafety frame-
work may be considered appropriate for the environmental
release of ‘‘synthetic’’ organisms. Recent discussions on
the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (CBD 2008) revealed
that developments in SB could lead to signiﬁcant gaps
despite the risk assessment framework presently in place
for GMOs. Currently, all risk assessments of living modi-
ﬁed organisms are conducted on a case-by-case basis as the
impacts depend upon the trait inserted, the recipient
organism and the environment into which it is released.
One of the differences between genetic engineering and SB
is that instead of single parts, whole systems can be
transferred, using hundreds or thousands of traits from
different donor organisms (multiple hybrids). Emergent
effects in the creation of synthetic genetic circuits could
cause problems in the design process and create new
uncertainties, so it is a relevant question whether the
established risk assessment practice is capable of dealing
with multiple hybrids. Also, the use of biological systems
made of alternative biochemical structures (enlarged
genetic alphabet) can probably not be assessed by current
risk research practices.
2
Few responses were obtained regarding the use of SB in
order to improve current biosafety systems. By making
systems more artiﬁcial (orthogonal), they may be rendered
unable to interact with natural systems. One participant
mentioned that such work had been carried out at least to
some extent, and that it would be a feasible option.
The topic of ‘‘biohackery’’ elicited a more intense dis-
cussion, especially on how realistic a biohacker scenario
was, and how biohackers would affect biosafety consider-
ations (see Schmidt 2008). Referring to the DIY Biology
google group,
3 a small but enthusiastic and growing com-
munity of biohackers does seem to exist (at least in the
US). In terms of biosafety some participants argued for
individual certiﬁcation and controlled access to key
reagents or equipment in order to reduce the safety risks
and to maintain control over the community. Others
rejected any kind of oversight by a few ‘‘privileged’’ and
argued for full democratization of biotechnology. Compa-
rable to a Wikipedia approach, they proposed to give every
citizen the possibility to design and fabricate biological
systems without being controlled by any kind of authority.
Other participants warned that such a total laissez-fair
approach to SB (everybody is allowed to design any kind
of organism) could lead to unprecedented risks and bio-
logical catastrophes. The answer to this was that a
catastrophe could be avoided if everybody would have the
tools to inhibit it. This line of argumentation supported the
development of a smart, empowered community capable of
responding quickly to problems, but also voiced the fear
that—with open access—we could ‘‘mindlessly screw up
the unity of life on earth’’.
The difference between the US and Europe over fears
regarding biosecurity (mainly in US) and biosafety (mainly
in Europe) got special attention. It was felt that we should
avoidindulginginyetanotherGMOdebateinEurope,which
mightarisefromfalsealarmsandtooprovocativealanguage
(implying terms such as ‘‘engineering life’’ or ‘‘artiﬁcial
cells’’). In the same vein, scientists should avoid ‘‘over-
hyping’’ beneﬁts and risks and try to keep the debate and
public exposure to the technology within reasonable terms.
Discussing the lessons learned from the GMO debate,
e-conference participants found it necessary to avoid the
dominance of trans-national companies and allowing for an
open source biology movement. Formerly, companies,
authorities and the scientiﬁc community had not taken into
account the social and moral concerns of NGOs and con-
sumers. What was needed in order to avoid mistakes of the
past was an open dialog between all involved stakeholders,
substantial public funding for the ﬁeld instead of the
dominance of a few companies, a clear analysis as to which
new safety regulations would be needed (and which to be
avoided) and the acceptance that there are other points of
view than those held by western scientists.
Taken together, the main issues seemed to be ﬁrstly,
whether SB as compared to genetic engineering poses
qualitatively new problems or whether there is a quantita-
tive extension of known issues only. Participants seemed to
hold different opinions as to which lessons can be drawn
from the experiences with genetic engineering, regarding
biosafety issues as well as public fears and hopes. It was
suggested that notable gaps exist in the knowledge base for 2 Among the few applications of SB, a genetic alphabet consisting of
alternative bases is used in diagnostic systems for detecting viral
infections.
3 See: http://groups.google.com/group/diybio/topics.
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123an appropriate risk assessment of SB. Secondly, how to
deal with societal developments resulting from the diffu-
sion of knowledge such as biohackery triggered some
debate. Proponents of stricter regulation met participants
who argued for a community based approach to prevent
unintended negative consequences.
Biosecurity awareness
A study conducted as part of the SYNBIOSAFE project in
2007 sought to establish the level of biosecurity awareness
among 20 leading European SB practitioners (Kelle 2007).
The interviews conducted to this end focused on several of
the milestones and key developments in the biosecurity
discourse as it had evolved over the past few years mostly
in the US. This survey showed an overall low level of
awareness of this biosecurity discourse, in particular with
respect to a report by the US National Academy of Sci-
ences (NAS), in which SB had been explicitly identiﬁed as
one area of concern for future bioweapons developments.
The NAS report expressed concern that ‘‘DNA synthesis
technology could allow for the efﬁcient, rapid synthesis of
viral and other pathogen genomes—either for the purposes
of vaccine development, or for malevolent purposes or with
unwanted consequences.’’ (NRC 2006).
Against this background the biosecurity section of the
e-conference sought ﬁrst to stimulate some discussion
about how the level of biosecurity awareness among SB
practitioners might be raised. One comment pointed to the
fact that there may be varying levels of biosecurity
awareness among different parts of the SB community,
with awareness being widespread among gene synthesis
companies and their industry organizations. The fact that
such diverging degrees of awareness should exist—and
have been apparent during the above-mentioned interviews
with SB practitioners in 2007—does not come as a surprise
given the requirement for gene synthesis companies to
comply with export control measures agreed among states
participating in the so-called Australia Group.
4 There was a
general consensus among e-conference participants that
education would be key in raising the level of awareness,
especially among those entering the ﬁeld of SB, be it from
other disciplines, such as engineering, or with a view to the
next generation of SB practitioners by redesigning science
and technology curricula from high-school level onwards
in order to effect a long-term change in this realm.
Linked to the question of the awareness of biosecurity
issues among SB practitioners was the question of the
practicability of self-governance mechanisms on the part
of the SB community in order to prevent the misuse of
this new ﬁeld of research. While some e-conference
participants seemed to worry that technology was moving
too fast and was too easily accessible to rely entirely on
self-governance mechanisms, others were more optimistic
that in case of misuse one might deploy ‘‘just as easily
synthetic genes as countermeasures’’. Another participant
pointed out that at this point in time self-governance was
vital because governments simply had not yet caught up
with developments. Furthermore, government regulation
would also be useful in promoting SB, as it would provide
a safe legal foundation upon which to operate. Others,
however, cautioned that care would need to be taken that
the SB community would not perceive formulation of
regulatory measures as directed against them. Hence SB
practitioners’ pro-active participation in such regulatory
instruments would be essential.
Discussion on the potential to foster the interaction
between the SB and biosecurity communities received
fewer interventions than other biosecurity aspects. One
current proposal put forward by a group of US SB experts
aims to establish an on-line clearing-house mechanism
where researchers could receive biosecurity advice on
potential experiments of concern. While certainly not a one-
stop solution to address all areas, an increased interaction
between SB practitioners and biosecurity experts would
be desirable. An online portal could make a useful contri-
bution towards educating the SB community—assuming
researchers will consult it frequently before conducting an
experiment or even submitting a grant application.
Concerning a potential European Biosecurity Oversight
Organisation (EBOO), there seemed to be a consensus
developing initially, according to which effective oversight
of biology and protection from a biochemical catastrophe
were impossible, and, by implication, that an EBOO would
be useless. A later comment, however, pointed out that
such an EBOO could be beneﬁcial in a number of ways: it
would provide a reassurance to the public that somebody
was taking the biosafety and biosecurity implications of SB
seriously; it could serve as an umbrella organization har-
monizing national efforts to address biosecurity issues, and
it could deﬁne clear standards of compliance for industry.
These comments were reinforced by another participant,
who emphasized the positive contribution made by gene
synthesis companies through their efforts to institutionalize
a comprehensive screening of DNA sequences before
orders are being sent out. An EBOO, in this view, would
usefully complement a bottom-up approach favored by
many for successfully developing SB.
With respect to potential improvements in the transat-
lantic dialog on biosecurity implications of SB, a reference
was made by one participant to the US National Science
Advisory Board on Biosecurity (NSABB) in this regard.
5
4 See www.australiagroup.net for more information.
5 See www.biosecurityboard.gov for more information.
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national Collaboration, which in turn has undertaken some
activities with a view to discuss biosecurity issues and dual-
use research in the life sciences in more general terms.
Another e-conference participant pointed out that the two
industry associations in the ﬁeld of SB, the IASB and the
ICPS, were likely to move beyond a mere dialog to concrete
action, in order to move forward on the screening of DNA
sequences by gene synthesis companies.
6 Noteworthy in
this context is the biosecurity workshop organized by the
IASB at the analytica inMunich, Germany, on 3April 2008.
Last but certainly not least, attention needs to be drawn
to a new subcategory of the biosecurity section of the e-
conference. It raised the issue of funding (or rather the lack
thereof) for biosecurity related research in the SB ﬁeld,
pointing out that the provision of sufﬁcient funding of
biosecurity measures now would have several beneﬁts: one
would have to engage a relatively small SB community
only; biosecurity solutions could grow along with devel-
opments in SB, and; starting work on these issues now
would put everybody with an interest in the unhampered
development of SB in a stronger position once the public
debate on the beneﬁts and potential downsides of SB
started in earnest.
Taken together, there is currently a low level of
awareness for biosecurity issues among academic SB
practitioners in Europe, although gene synthesis companies
have launched some promising initiatives. There were
different views on how to proceed, in particular over the
role of self-governance. Institutional solutions with dif-
ferent structures and competences highlight the different
functions regulation may take, from preventing disaster to
providing a framework for the safe operation of industry
and a reassurance for the public. Adequate biosecurity
funding may also lead to a better informed debate on the
risks involved in SB.
Intellectual property rights (IPR)
Synthetic Biology is a young discipline; therefore, it is still
unclear how the accessibility of its results and products
should be regulated. We opened the discussion on IPR
issues with the question whether patents or an open source
system, as known from software, would be a more appro-
priate strategy for SB (Henkel and Maurer 2007; Hope
2008). One respondent pointed out that whether patents
were desirable or not depended on the objectives related to
them. He thought that in patent commons, where patents
were pledged for a pool and others were encouraged to use
them for development purposes, patents could be desirable.
Another participant agreed that there was no proven
argumentation saying open source was always better than
patents or vice versa. But in case of the development of
standards, which everybody wants to share, he clearly
pleaded for open source. He argued that the decision on
which of several standards was most widely used was
based on an accidental selection. Since patents should not
reward an ‘‘accident in history’’, standards should not be
patented.
Another participant disagreed, because he thought parts
could only be commercialized if they could be protected
from competing companies. He noted that a system was
required in which businesses could patent parts whereas
they remained freely accessible for academic researchers
this could be achieved by licenses, which would grant free
use of patented parts to academic research and hobbyists.
One discussant conceded that ‘‘open source’’ without
patents was a desirable strategy for computer software, but
he doubted that it was applicable for biology because the
analogy between software and biological technologies was
not correct ‘‘DNA is neither physically nor legally the same
thing as code and biology is neither physically nor legally
the same thing as software.’’ He argued that the distribution
of DNA licenses required the exclusion of others using the
DNA, and that this was today only possible via a patent.
However, in computer technology it was easier to exclude
others from using a source code, because the computer
scientist had written it by himself.
To the question in which areas of SB patenting was
justiﬁed one participant replied that patenting of basic tools
could hinder academic research and the development of SB
applications especially if patents had broad claims or were
overlapping. Another respondent stated that our question
implied that there were areas of SB in which patenting
was not justiﬁed, which he regarded as a questionable
assumption. Furthermore, he believed that it did not make
sense to discuss patent issues in the isolated context of SB,
because SB was not different from other technical areas.
One discussant pointed out that patents did not primarily
limit the accessibility of the patented object but that, on the
contrary, scientiﬁc knowledge could remain accessible
thanks to patents because without patents companies would
not open their inventions and discoveries to the public.
Taken together, the contributions of the IPR section
illustrate the different positions of open access proponents
and participants who considered such an approach as not
desirable or not feasible. This difference reﬂects the con-
ﬂict of interest between academic research and commercial
application. Moreover, the e-conference depicts the dif-
ferent perceptions of patents. For some participants patents
symbolize a closed strategy, for others they are the pre-
requisite to make scientiﬁc knowledge accessible.
6 See the webpages of the International Consortium for Polynucle-
otide Synthesis (ICPS) at http://pgen.us/ICPS.htm and of the Industry
Association SB (IASB) at http://www.ia-sb.eu/.
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Starting from the question whether there is a need for new
regulation, a participant contributed a long excerpt from an
upcoming book chapter to discuss the merits and perils of
SB regulation. The argument was that attempts at con-
trolling the production and distribution of knowledge,
skills, and materials are doomed to fail. Taking the
example of illegal drugs regulation, it shows how a black
market is created, production is driven to clandestine
organizations abroad and control is efﬁciently prevented.
While nuclear proliferation control is achieved via pro-
hibiting access to key materials, with biology raw material
is ubiquitous and scientists educated in industrialized
countries spread the skills all over the world. Therefore,
regulation is neither possible nor sensible and would
diminish security. Rather, the strategy should be to ensure
that activities in SB are transparent.
Other participants seemed to be reluctant to discuss the
issue in general terms; rather, they pointed at various
reports on nanotechnology providing examples of how to
do: the Royal Society (2004) report asked for involving
‘‘a variety of publics’’ to construct a regulatory framework
not the least in order to modulate commercial inﬂuence.
The US Lemon–Relman report (Relman et al. 2006) called
for broad risk awareness, and the NSABB (2007) report
proposed oversight over dual-use life-science research
including a dialog with other countries in analogy to
chemical weapons regulation. The EC (2008) attempted to
establish a Code of Conduct towards good governance of
nanotechnology incorporating the ‘‘seven principles’’. In
addition, as a practical way to involvement, community
‘‘hands-on’’ projects in SB were proposed to enhance the
motivation for discussing issues.
Should the precautionary principle be applied, and what
might be the outcome? A participant pointed out that most
European countries have revised their regulatory frame-
works towards separation of science and politics, to
transparency and participation. The precautionary principle
gets progressively adapted towards more ﬂexibility rather
than more regulation. For SB, a mix of technology
assessment and regulatory alternatives could provide new
ways of decision-making. Another participant considered
the precautionary principle to halt technology development
and proposed a ‘‘proactionary’’ principle emphasizing the
right to innovate as an alternative.
Perception and media
A crucial question is whether SB will meet public resis-
tance as agricultural biotechnology did. A participant
suggested that new technologies do not necessarily trigger
adverse reactions and that SB could be as accepted as
mobile phones are today. While user beneﬁts of mobile
phones have been obvious before risks became apparent, it
was argued that at least in Europe, there might be a public
bias for skepticism because supporters had downplayed the
risks of technological breakthroughs. With new technol-
ogy, people might fear unknowns as well as exploitation by
powerful interests. Since SB has a low proﬁle yet, a
contributor thought that protests are less likely. They would
be possible, however, if something untoward happens,
which then might ensue heavy regulation or lack of fund-
ing. The example of artemisinin shows that ‘‘unknowns’’
loose their threat if beneﬁts for humanity can be shown.
A participant emphasized the role of fascination seen with
the iGEM competition,
7 which may inﬂuence perceptions
positively. Accordingly, a prerequisite is a rudimentary
public understanding of science. Hyperbolic expectations,
however, should be tempered in order not to create
disappointment.
As the most appropriate way of inﬂuencing perceptions,
participation rather than attempts at technically steering the
debate was proposed. Scientists’ role could be to ‘‘inject’’
scientiﬁc knowledge as well as examples of applications,
such as it had happened with stem cell research. Concep-
tual and terminological correctness is necessary, in
particular regarding terms that might elicit fear such as
‘‘artiﬁcial life’’. Also, problems should be deﬁned correctly
and not just sold as new.
Whether scientists should engage in a public debate
might be a matter of timing and wording. A participant
considered relevant messages and the right way of com-
munication a prerequisite. Again, nanotechnology got
mentioned as an example that has become positively
framed in contrast to agricultural biotechnology. Here, a
balance has been achieved between the communication of
beneﬁts from daily products and risks without denying the
latter, resulting in a positive-neutral image. This was
attributed to the involvement of scientists from the very
beginning. Accordingly for SB, daily experiences with
applications need to be linked to general visions and
approaches. Scientists have to back this process with facts,
bridging the gap between science and public usage. How-
ever, scientists should always gauge the effects of their
communication efforts.
A participant proposed to take a contrasting approach
from the very beginning by openly involving different
publics in a wider debate about what drives science today.
Referring to the Demos report (Irwin et al. 2006), it was
stressed that scientists have learned from discussing the
publics’ various understandings as much as lay people have
learned from scientists. ‘‘The public’’ consists of many
7 See http://parts2.mit.edu/wiki/index.php/Main_Page.
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the right message is the prerequisite for success.
In conclusion, there is reluctance on the feasibility, and
the sensibility, of a special regulation of SB. The example
of nanotechnology shows that there are a variety of other
approaches better suited to deal with new technology. This
could also refer to more traditional interpretations of the
precautionary principle. Regarding public perceptions,
again the example of nanotechnology demonstrates that it
is possible to arrive at a neutral to positive image, provided
scientists take a more reﬂexive and less one-way oriented
approach towards the public than with genetic engineering
in the past.
Conclusions
Throughout the e-conference, inherent analogies played an
important role. Most prominently, the question was whe-
ther SB was to be considered an entirely new development
or merely an extension of previous endeavors, for example,
in genetic engineering. Consequently, implications both
with respect to ethical, safety, and security risk issues
appeared in a different light depending on their throwing
up entirely new problems or just transferring existing
problems to a new level.
Regarding biosafety, there are different opinions on the
novelty of risk issues. Although there are established risk
assessment protocols, in the light of radically new devel-
opmentscurrentapproachesmightturnouttobeinadequate.
While risk featured prominently also with respect to ethics,
it is an error to believe people are interested only in safety
and security issues or the consequences (e.g., in terms of
justice) of certain applications. Apparently many partici-
pants thought that creating new forms of life did not just
raise the issueofaccidentallywashingalteredbacteria down
the sink. Thus, more fundamental questions may well play a
role when debatingSB in the future. This does not only refer
totheissueof‘‘creatinglife’’butalsotocertainapplications,
inparticularthosethataimatimprovinghumanperformance
bytechnicalmeanstotheamountofarrivingatnewformsof
human beings. Clearly, such aims might fuel a debate that
exceeds that over genetic engineering over recent years.
Greater concerns seem to be triggered by the populari-
zation of knowledge supported by parts of the SB
community. Again, what is at stake seems to be determined
by analogies, in this case the analogy to the proliferation of
programming skills giving rise to the sub-culture of hack-
ers (Schmidt 2008). Such biohacking might in fact
constitute a serious threat in terms of safety and/or security,
although there seem to be different opinions as to the
signiﬁcance of such issues on both sides of the Atlantic.
Again, analogies to problems unrelated to SB but more or
less visible on the political agenda may play an important
role in determining reactions to perceived threats.
Comparing SB to computer science might also have left
its mark on the discussion over intellectual property rights.
Apart from the question whether there can be drawn
analogies between the both of them at all, generic issues of
patenting versus open source played a role that may go
beyond factual arguing and be rooted in different value
systems.
How to deal with real—or perceived—threats? The
issue of potential regulation comes easily to mind, but there
are obvious limits to its feasibility and sensibility. In an era
where top-down regulation gives way to governance
involving relevant stakeholders, previous debates about
whether or not to go for a strict regulatory approach seem
out of place. Nanotechnology provides an example of how
to deal with an emerging technology, retaining a neutral or
positive public image. The argument that regulation is
necessary for reasons of public perceptions may be out-
dated. Whether it is necessary to prevent harm might be
another question.
Therefore, the analogy to past debates on genetic engi-
neering may have its limits. Yet it is this debate that many
participants think will be revived with SB. There are clear
indications of fear within the scientiﬁc community of a
conﬂict under the header of ‘‘GMOs revisited’’, and they
struggle for lessons that could have been learned. However,
participants do not agree on the most appropriate strategy
to avoid such a conﬂict. Opinions range from ‘‘being pro-
active’’ to ‘‘avoiding hype’’ or ‘‘not drawing too much
attention to the ﬁeld’’.
As a conclusion from our e-conference we can say that
there is a need for genuine discourse that does not exclude
more fundamental question of how we think, and think
differently, about the moral status of the life forms SB
deals with, now and in the future. Reﬂexivity in such a
discourse means that it will be more about ﬁnding out how
interests and world-views differ, and what to do with such
differences, than to ﬁgure out the single answer to these
questions.
Our e-conference has shown that there is a chance for
such a discourse happening, as we have experienced par-
ticipation beyond expectation both with respect to the
number of views and contributions as well as to the variety
of backgrounds and arguments. It showed that the rules to
govern such a discourse might be set up much easier and be
respected more readily than many would suggest. In our
opinion, this is a good harbinger of debates on SB to come.
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